Herman Bavinck’s Reformed Dogmatics: Borrowed Presuppositions

In our last few posts we rifled through some of Bavinck ’s Prolegomena . His basic presupposition is that the knowledge of God comes through his own disclosure (special revelation, SR) and is contained in Scripture, which is the guiding light of theology. So, which has the ‘rights’ to govern and explain the content of revelation; philosophy (rationalism) or theology (realism)? We shall see.

In Part III of his Prolegomena , Bavinck discusses the Principia of dogma as a science whose object of study is independent of other disciplines. As a science, dogma is driven by its own content (SR) otherwise it would not be “a science concerning God (scientia de Deo ).” Against Bavinck ’s claim is the [qualified] rationalism (Kant, Schleiermacher ) that presupposes the content of dogmatics is dependent on philosophy to make its truths known; e.g., are dogmatic claims made through empirical or idealistic theories? Bavinck says neither , insisting in strong terms that philosophical investigation cannot explain, or stand at the fore of dogmatics as they question the very possibility of God’s revelation: the very foundation of dogma. If theology were to proceed on this course, it could never arrive at certainty. Supposing dogma gets its foundations from another source, the principle of dogma would depend on something other than God’s special revelation.

Bavinck ’s term “borrowed presuppositions” divides the central issue facing dogmatics: the faith of theology and the rationalism of philosophy. He does not, however, divide faith and reason as strikingly as say, Elohim dividing day from night and calling it a done deal. Instead he asserts up front, as he has so consistently maintained everywhere, that, “there is indeed some room in theology for theoretical reflection on fundamental principles,” so long as theologians do their reflecting within Christianity. The weight of Bavinck ’s point rests on the assumption that rationalistic speculation starts with a principle other than revelation and eventually works towards (or away from) faith. Bavinck does not use the term “borrowed presuppositions” to expressly indicate other worldviews ‘borrowing’ their philosophical framework, signs and signifiers from Christianity, and so far it doesn’t seem as if he is heading in that direction. For one, he’s less concerned about apologetics (cf. Bahnsen/Van Till), and for another he is clearing the study of dogma from the subjective “history of religion” approach that entrenched itself in the modern approach to theology.

It is so tempting to roll right into Bavinck’s discussion of the problem of evil/origin of sin, with the aim of demonstrating the consistency of his theory and practice. But our next few posts will at least draw a few more thumbnail sketches of Bavinck’s views on general and special revelation, before plunging into the deep problem of darkness.